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Supreme Court has recognized the impossibility of embracing in
a statute every variation of the type of conduct prescribed as
criminal; and has sanctioned the use of broad language in defining crimes, provided the line between criminal and non-criminal conduct is clearly and distinctly drawn.
ROBERT
PRICE FIXING AGREEMENTS-PATENTED

T.

JORDAN

PRODUCTS-Defendants,

Line Material Company and Southern State Equipment Company, cross-licensed each other to use complementary patents
on an electrical product. The Line Material Company was authorized to sublicense on condition that the sublicensee maintain the
same price schedule as Southern States and other licensees.
Held, this violates the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.' "Even if a
patentee has a right in the absence of a purpose
to restrain or
monopolize trade, to fix prices on a licensee's sale of the patented product in order to exploit properly his invention or inventions, when patentees join in an agreement as here to maintain
prices on their several products, that agreement, however advantageous it may be to stimulate the broader use of patents, is
unlawful per se under the Sherman Act."'2 United States v. Line
Material Company, 68 S. Ct. 550 (U.S. 1948).
The conflict between the monopoly granted by the patent
laws 3 and the competition prescribed by the Sherman Act has
been recognized in a series of cases. The immediate problem of
price fixing under the protection of the patent laws was considered in United States v. General Electric Company and Bement & Sons v. National Harrow Company.5 Both cases upheld
the validity of price fixing provisions in contracts between the
patentee and a licensee to make and sell. Although the decisions
suffered subsequent sharp attack,6 they were never overruled.
taking of anything of value which belongs to another, either without the

consent of the other to the misappropriation or taking, or by means of
fraudulent conduct, practices or representations. An intent to deprive the
other permanently of whatever may be the subject of the misappropriation
or taking is essential."
This article was held constitutional in State v. Pete, 206 La. 1078, 20
So.(2d) 368 (1944).
1. 26 Stat. 209 (1890).

2. 68 S.Ct. 550, 564 (U.S. 1948).
3. 35 U.S.C.A § 31 and annotations thereunder.
4. 272 U.S. 476, 47 S.Ct. 192, 71 L.Ed. 362 (1926).
5. 186 U.S. 70, 22 S.Ct. 747, 46 L.Ed. 1058 (1902).
6. Kelley, Restraints of Trade and the Patent Law (1944) 32 Geo. L. J.
213; Note (1927) 40 Harv. L. Rev. 656; Note (1927) 27 Col. L. Rev. 567.
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However, fixing the resale price of the patented product itself
had been declared violative of the Sherman Act.7
The Line Material case involved a license to manufacture
and sell and not the sale of the patented article itself. The district court decided that the situation was the same as that presented in the General Electric case, and that the price-fixing provisions in the licenses should be held valid upon the authority
of that case.8 The Supreme Court, however, reversed the trial
court. Three different approaches were taken to the General
Electric case. Mr. Justice Reed, who delivered the opinion of
the Court, thought that the General Electric case was meant to
include only isolated contracts and not cross-licensing agreements. Mr. Justice Douglas, with Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice
Murphy, and Mr. Justice Rutledge joining, agreed in a concurring
opinion that the General Electric case recognized the validity of
price fixing provisions between a patentee and his licensee to
make and sell. He thought, however, that the situation in the
Line Material case was exactly the same as that presented in the
General Electric case, and, therefore, that the earlier case should
be expressly overruled, since the "exclusive right" given the
patentee in the United States Constitution 9 was never meant
to authorize price restrictions. Mr. Justice BurtOn, with whom
Mr. Chief Justice Vinson and Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurred,
dissented. They considered the rule of the General Electric and
Bement cases sound and controlling in the instant case.
It is submitted that the concurring opinion in the Line Material case is the better view, and that the General Electric and
Bement cases should be overruled. A distinction was originally
made between a contract of sale of the patented article and a
7. It appears well settled today that any resale price maintenance, not
specially authorized by statute, where the patented product itself has been
sold is a contract in restraint of trade and violates the Sherman Act. United
States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 62 S. Ct. 1088, 86 L. Ed. 1408 (1942)
(where the patentee attempted to control the price of the patented product
in the hands of the finishing licensee who took the final steps in the manufacturing process after purchase from the manufacturing licensee); Ethyl
Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 60 S.Ct. 618, 84 L.Ed. 852 (1940);
Boston Store of Chicago v. American Graphophone Co., 246 U.S. 8, 38 S.Ct.
257, 62 L.Ed. 551 (1918); Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 243 U.S. 490,
37 S.Ct. 412, 61 LEd. 866 (1917); Bauer v. O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 33 S.Ct. 616,
47 L.Ed. 1041 (1913). See Marcus, Patents, Antitrust Law and Antitrust
Judgments Through Hartford-Empire (1945) 34 Geo. L.J. 1. This interpretation of the Sherman Act has been relaxed somewhat by the Miller-Tydings
Amendment which allows price fixing under certain conditions. See 50
Stat. 693 (1937).
8. 64 F.(2d) 970 (E.D. Wis. 1948).
9. U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8(8).
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contract to manufacture and sell that same article. In the case
of a contract to sell, it was argued that title to the article passed.
Therefore, the vendor was not the owner and could no longer
control its sale. In that case it was said that what was sold was
not the article but only the right to manufacture and sell it.
Therefore, the licensor could legally impose price restrictions on
the sale.10 The practical foundation of this argument collapses
when it is recognized that the restraint on commerce of a price
fixing provision is equally effective whether imposed through a
contract of sale or a contract to make and sell.
One policy argument for allowing price fixing in licenses to
make and sell is to encourage the patentee to license, thus reducing the effect of the monopoly. But whether the patentee is
the sole manufacturer, or whether he licenses others to manufacture and sell under fixed prices, the public still suffers the
effect of monopoly price and remains without the advantages of
the competitive market.
It is also argued that, since the patentee has the "exclusive
right" to his discovery, he may exercise that right not only by
refusing to license but also by attaching stipulations to any
license which he does issue. Price fixing provisions in connection
with the sale of non-patented products have been held illegal
under the Sherman Act. 1 The right, therefore, to condition the
license does not necessarily include the right to attach illegal
conditions. United States v. General Electric condoned price fixing on patented products "provided the conditions of sale are
normally and reasonably adapted to secure pecuniary reward
for the patentee's monopoly. '12 The view of the concurring opinion is that price fixing conditions in the General Electric case are
not normal and reasonable. This view invalidates price fixing
even in the case of an isolated contract to make and sell. Where
licenses are issued to many licensees in concert, accompanying
price fixing provisions have been declared invalid.' 3 The pat10. See Havighurst, The Legal :Status of Industrial Control by Patent
(1941) 35 Ill. L. Rev. 495, 510.
11. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 31
S.Ct. 376, 55 L.Ed. 502 (1910); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273
U.S. 392, 47 S.Ct. 377, 71 L.Ed. 700 (1927); Sugar Institute v. United States,
297 U.S. 553, 56 S.Ct. 629, 80 L.Ed. 859 (1936); United States v. SoconyVacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 60 S.Ct. 811, 84 L.Ed. 1129 (1940).
12. 272 U.S. 476, 47 S.Ct. 192, 71 L.Ed. 362 (1926).
13. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20, 33 S.Ct.
9, 57 L.Ed. 107 (1912); Standard Oil Co. of Indiana v. United States, 283 U.S.
163, 51 S.Ct. 421, 75 L.Ed. 926 (1931); Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States,
323 U.S. 386, 65 S.Ct. 373, 89 L.Ed. 322 (1945); United States v. National Lead
Co., 322 U.S. 319, 67 S.Ct. 1634, 91 L.Ed. 2077 (1947).
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entee receives a normal and reasonable pecuniary reward through
his royalty provisions. He would be equally well protected by
royalty provisions where there is but one contract.
In United States v. United States Gypsum Company,14 decided at the same time as the Line Material Company case, the
Court held invalid an industry-wide licensing agreement, containing price fixing provisions, reversing a ruling by the district
court15 based on the precedent of United States v. General Electric. The Supreme Court held the General Electric case applicable only in the absence of conspiratorial intent. Under this
reasoning Mr. Justice Reed's distinction between the Line Material Company case and the General Electric case is unnecessary
if the distinction is grounded instead upon the existence of conspiratorial intent.
Whatever approach is adopted by the Court in the future its
ultimate holding in the Line Material Company case seems justifiable on grounds of public policy and consistent with recent
decisions restricting the "exclusive right" of the patentee to
remain consonant with the best interests of the public. Free
competition is one of the basic assumptions of a workable capitalistic economy. Competition, to be economically "free," necessarily involves price competition. Fixed prices, even under the.
guise of patent monopoly, disturb open competition and create
abnormal and controlled market conditions.
VIRGINIA L. MARTIN

TORTS-AUTOMOBILES-POST-COLLISION ACcIDENTs-Defendant's truck was parked on the highway at night without flares or

warning lights. The second defendant's automobile, traveling at
an excessive rate of speed, crashed into the rear of the truck
when defective brakes failed to hold. Plaintiff, a passerby, extricated defendant car driver and his wife from the burning car
and returned for a floor mat to use as a pillow for the wife's head.
On the floor of the car plaintiff found a pistol, which he handed
to the defendant car driver. The car driver, temporarily deranged
by the shock of the accident, fired the pistol, striking plaintiff in
the leg. Held, on appeal from a judgment sustaining an exception
of no cause of action, the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury
was the concurring negligence of both defendants. Reversed and
remanded. Lynch v. Fisher, 34 So. (2d) 513 (La. App. 1948).
14. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 68 S.Ct. 525 (U.S. 1948).
15. 67 F. Supp. 397 (App. D.C. 1948).

